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Abstract 
In this paper, we highlight a number of problems arising with a commonly used supplier 
selection method: the weighted factor score method. We discuss the behavior of this method 
with respect to weighting, scaling issues, and relative scoring. Assuming that there is no 
convex dominance, we formally prove that with the same supplier selection method, we can 
make any supplier win by judiciously choosing the right parameters of the awarding 
mechanism. This means that any supplier can win if certain parameters are not published in a 
request for a proposal. This result applies to both absolute and relative scoring methods. Also, 
we show that the buyer should fully disclose all details of the awarding mechanism to 
suppliers in order to get better bids. The practical implications of our results are far reaching 
for (public) procurement: full transparency and disclosure of all details of weights and 
awarding schemes is not only required to avoid subjectivity in supplier selection, but it also 
leads to better bids from suppliers.  
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Introduction 
 
Supplier selection has attracted quite some attention from academics. Possible reasons for this 
are its perceived importance, its visibility (at least in the sense that the ultimate outcome is 
identifiable), and its suitability for formal, mathematical modeling. Many academic papers 
describe various formal decision methods, decision elements, supplier behavior in tendering, 
and quantitative and qualitative decision criteria for supplier selection (e.g., Albano et al., 
2008; De Boer et al., 1998, 2001; De Boer and Van der Wegen 2003; Choi and Hartley, 1996; 
Munson and Rosenblatt, 1997; Narasimhan, 1983; Weber and Current, 1993).  
 
In addition to this academic attention, quite some attention has been paid to supplier selection 
by governments and legal experts. For instance, the European Union (EU) directives state that 
to enhance transparency, objectivity, and non-discrimination, tendering organizations should 
publish (1) the decision criteria and (2) their relative importance (if applicable) in a Request 
for a Proposal (RfP).  
 
Despite this amount of attention from academia, public policy makers, and practitioners, the 
practical use of formal decision methods is not without problems and misuse. This can be 
explained by the fact that many aspects play a role in supplier selection and many decision 
criteria and methods can be considered, whilst the effects of these methods are not always 
known. As a result, many organizations, especially in the public sector when trying to identify 
an Economically Most Advantageous Tender (EMAT), struggle with the pressure to explain 
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their supplier selection choices (De Boer et al., 2006). Therefore, we argue that it is important 
to gain a deeper understanding of the practical features and dynamics of commonly used 
supplier selection methods. 
 
Using mathematical proofs, our research objective is to determine the scope of a number of 
problems arising with commonly used supplier selection methods in the public sector to 
identify an EMAT. In particular, we explore when and what can happen if decision criteria 
and their weights are published, but other parameters of the awarding mechanism – that are 
not mentioned in the EU directives – are not published in an RfP. Under a rather mild 
assumption, we show that every supplier in a tender can win if specific details of the awarding 
mechanism can be determined after the fact. We also show that it is theoretically optimal for 
the buyer to fully disclose all details of the awarding mechanism to suppliers.  
 
The paper makes a novel contribution in two ways. First, our paper extends beyond the 
existing literature by providing formal mathematical proofs of the problems that may occur in 
applying common supplier selection methods. We also show what the effects of full 
transparency can be. Based on our first contribution, we provide insights for (public) 
procurement practitioners seeking to apply a supplier selection method. 
 
The paper is organized in the following way. First, we use an example from practice to 
introduce our main research question. Second, we provide our main analysis and proofs on 
how we can make any supplier win a tender. Next, we show and analyze some extensions and 
practical implications of our proofs. The last sections discuss the limitations and some 
conclusions. 
 
A supplier selection case 
 
We introduce our supplier selection model using a simple example. In this example, there are 
two decision criteria, namely price (pi for each supplier i) and quality (qi for each supplier i). 
In our example, we measure quality in delivery time. Weights wj for each criterion j are 
chosen to reflect the relative importance of the criteria. Here, quality is considered to be more 
important than price. Accordingly, the details of the awarding mechanism are published in an 
RfP as shown in Table 1.  
 
Supplier i 
(weights wj) 
Price pi 
 (40%) 
Quality (delivery time) qi 
(60%) 
Table 1: A supplier selection example 
  
In this paper, we consider the well-known and widely used Weighted Factor Score (WFS) 
method as a supplier selection method. In WFS, all suppliers are awarded scores on all 
criteria. These scores are multiplied (weighted) with the respective weights of the criteria and 
for each supplier i the total score is defined as WFSi. The supplier with the highest total score 
is awarded the contract. In the RfP, it is published that WFS is used as a selection method, but 
the scoring methods are not published. 
 
In Table 2, the details of the supplier bids are given.  
 
Supplier i 
(weights wj) 
Price pi 
 (40%) 
Quality (delivery time) qi 
(60%) 
Supplier 1 € 4,200 18 weeks 
Supplier 2 € 4,500 15 weeks 
Supplier 3 € 4,750 13 weeks 
Table 2: A supplier selection example with supplier data 
  
The scores on the criteria can be calculated by the buyer by various scoring methods. We 
classify these methods in absolute and relative methods. The calculations in relative methods 
depend on the best, worst and/or average supplier bids, while the calculations in absolute 
methods are independent of the other supplier bids.  
 
Both absolute and relative scores can be detailed in various ways. For example, the 
parameters used in their formula may be chosen by the buyer as well as the form of the graphs 
involved: linear or curved (and of course, also what kind of curvature). 
 
In our example, the weighted scores on price range from 0 to 40 points. Below, we give a few 
examples of formula to calculate the scores: 
 An absolute linear score:     ii ppAL  002.040  
 An absolute curved score:  
000,5
000,5
40 ii
ppAC   
 A relative linear score:       ii pppppRL  321 ,,min
3575  
 A relative curved score:      
i
i p
ppppRC 321 ,,min40   
 
The scores on quality range from 0 to 60 points. To simplify our example, we calculate the 
scores on quality with the absolute linear scoring method   ii qqAL  160 . This method 
leads to the quality scores 42, 45, and 47 for respectively suppliers 1, 2, and 3. The price 
scoring methods above lead to the price scores and total WFS scores (price scores + quality 
scores) as shown in Table 3. It is clear from the table that a different scoring method may lead 
to a different winner. 
 
Supplier i ALi(p) WFSi  ACi(p) WFSi RLi(p) WFSi RCi(p) WFSi 
Supplier 1 31.6 73.6 16.0 58.0 40.0 82.0 40.0 82.0 
Supplier 2 31.0 76.0 12.6 57.6 37.5 82.5 37.3 82.3 
Supplier 3 30.5 77.5 8.9 55.9 35.4 82.4 35.4 82.4 
Table 3: Price scores and total scores for the supplier selection example (winning total scores are 
indicated in bold) 
 
This simple example leads to our main research question: (how) can any supplier win by 
judiciously managing certain details – such as the gradient of a price scoring method – of the 
awarding mechanism?  
 
In our analysis in the next section, we make the following basic assumption.  
 
Assumption 1. We assume that there is no convex dominance.  
 
This assumption implies that no bid is dominated on all criteria by a convex combination of 
the other bids. Among other things, this also implies that no bid is the best bid on all criteria. 
 
Results 
 
In this section, we state several theorems and illustrate them using our supplier selection 
example. The proofs of the theorems can be found in the appendix of this paper. Our first 
theorem is a necessary theorem for the next theorems and is defined as follows.  
 
Theorem 1. In the WFS, weights do not play a role in the comparison of total scores.  
 
While the formal proof of this theorem is in the appendix, its validity is easily understood by 
recognizing that the weights on the criteria are always multiplied by the scores and 
consequently by the scale of the scoring methods. 
 
Our second theorem builds on the first one. It defines and quantifies a problem that may arise 
when a buyer tries to identify an EMAT and has the intention of influencing the outcome of 
the tender. If the buyer does not publish certain scoring method information in an RfP, he can 
determine a scoring method – after receiving all the bids – such that the supplier of his choice 
wins the tender.  
 
Theorem 2. Under our assumption, we can make any supplier in a public tender win by a 
judicious choice of the gradient gj of an absolute scoring method.  
 
In our example, Theorems 1 and 2 imply that if the buyer wants supplier 1 to score higher 
than supplier 2, he can do so by choosing the gradient of the price scoring method. Using our 
proofs, supplier 1 wins if 
12
21
21 pp
qqgg 
  and 
200,4500,4
151811 
g . So, for example, if 
 in  or in 0.011 g   ii pgpAL  140   ii pgpAL  1400 , then supplier 1 has a higher 
total score than supplier 2.  
 
While Theorem 2 applies to absolute scoring methods, we have a similar Theorem 3 that 
applies to relative scoring methods.  
 
Theorem 3. Under our assumptions, we can make any supplier in a public tender win by a 
judicious choice of  the gradient gj of a relative scoring method.  
 
In our example, Theorem 3 means for instance that if the buyers wants supplier 1 to score 
higher than supplier 2, he can do so by choosing the right gradient of the price scoring method 
such that      12
21
21
2
21
1
,min,min pp
qq
qq
s
pp
s

  and 
200,4500,4
15181
200,4
1

s . So, for 
example, if  in 241 g   ii pggpRL  200,440 11  or in   ii p
ggpRL 
200,4
400 11 , 
then supplier 1 has a higher total score than supplier 2.  
 
Practical implications 
 
One obvious way to avoid the difficulty of having a buyer judiciously choosing the 
parameters of a scoring method to make his favorite supplier win is to publish these details in 
advance in an RfP. This is an adequate measure in case of absolute scoring methods. 
However, in the case of relative scoring methods this is not adequate either as the suppliers 
have another possibility to influence the outcome of the supplier selection process: asking 
other suppliers (possibly in exchange for something else) to submit an additional bid. This is 
usually termed “bid rigging”. 
 
In our example, if the complete relative scoring method is published in the RfP, supplier 1 
could use this knowledge to its advantage by inviting another supplier to submit a bid with a 
very low price even though that supplier may have dismal quality. This fourth supplier should 
submit a bid such that 
200,4500,4
1518135
4 

p
rite as  that we rew 01.035 
p
500,34 p . Thus, if the price of supplier 4 is less than 3,500, supplier 1 wins the tender in 
stead of supplier 2. Note that this is just one disadvantage of using relative scoring methods. 
For more disadvantages of such methods, we refer to De Boer et al. (2006) and Albano et a
4
 and as 
l. 
008).  
t there is another and possibly even 
 is optimal for the buyer to fully disclose all details of the awarding mechanism to suppliers. 
e buyer prefers. The supplier will have to make an educated guess when 
 bids that make the same profit, he will submit the bid that leads to the highest 
tal score.  
ions of the buyer, as the buyer can indicate what he believes to be a 
ood price and quality.  
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The explanations of Theorems 1, 2, and 3 already show that there are disadvantages 
connected to not publishing all details of the awarding mechanism to suppliers. First, the 
buyer can influence which supplier wins. Second, when a relative scoring method is used, 
even the supplier can influence which supplier wins. Bu
more important practical implication of these theorems:  
 
It
 
It is not only buyers that face choices in the supplier selection process. The suppliers also face 
choices in preparing their bids. They must choose whether or not to work in overtime and 
deliver faster at a higher price or they can promise longer guarantee periods at a higher price 
et cetera. So, the suppliers have a bid selection problem before they hand in their bids. If the 
gradient of the scoring method is not published or if a relative scoring method is used, then 
the supplier does not know how many points he will score on the criteria. So actually, he does 
not know what th
selecting his bid. 
 
If the buyer does publish all details, a rational supplier can and will use this knowledge to 
optimize his total score and this can only lead to bids that better fit the needs of the buyer (as 
they score higher). The supplier still has to deal with competition, but if the supplier can offer 
two different
to
 
Note that it is only possible to publish all details of the scoring method when an absolute 
scoring method is used. Relative scoring methods can be published as abstract formula, but a 
supplier can never calculate the scores as they depend on other bids coming in as well. 
Relative scoring methods will never guarantee to fit the preferences of the buyer, as their 
exact form and position depends on the bids coming in. As such, relative scoring methods 
replace the preferences of a buyer by a lottery, because the lowest price is determined by the 
market and not by the buyer. Only absolute scoring methods can be used to accurately 
represent the value funct
g
Limitations 
 
Our assumption on the absence of convex dominance is rather mild as the presence of convex 
dominance basically implies that there is always a combination of other bids that dominates 
the dominated bid. This assumption is necessary to prove the theorems for the linear scoring 
functions. We do believe however that there will be non-linear scoring methods (both 
absolute and relative) that do not need this assumption to obtain the same results. We expect 
the general form of these methods to depend on the bids involved.  
 
Our results apply to all supplier selection methods that use a weighted factor score. This 
means that besides the Weighted Factor Score method, our results also apply to common 
methods such as the Canadian method (De Boer et al., 2006), the Lowest Acceptable Price 
method (De Boer et al., 2006), and the Lowest Corrected Price method (Dreschler, 2009). All 
these methods can be used for multiple quantitative and/or qualitative criteria tenders. 
However, our results may not apply to other methods, such as Outranking or Value for 
Money.  
 
Conclusions 
 
We show that the Weighted Factor Score (WFS) supplier selection method is very sensitive to 
scoring methods. If certain parameters are not published in an RfP, an informed buyer can 
make almost any supplier win the tender by judiciously choosing some scoring method 
details. Therefore, it is wise to be completely transparent and publish full details of the 
scoring methods in the RfP. Not only does it prevent fraud, but we also prove that it yields 
better bids for the buying organization. 
 
The EU directives do not explicitly state that tendering organizations should publish the 
scoring method used to calculate a score for a decision criterion. Based on our findings, we 
recommend adjusting the EU regulations to incorporate the requirement to publish all details 
of the scoring methods to be used. 
 
Also, we prove that relative scoring methods are susceptible to some kind of influencing by 
supplier bidding strategies. Especially, it turns out that some commonly used scoring 
mechanisms may have detrimental effects on almost all methods in the sense that they might 
yield rank reversal. We provide mathematical proofs of the possibility of rank reversal. 
 
A thorough understanding of the phenomena studied in this paper might prevent the problems 
observed from occurring. The insights gained through this analysis may help (public) 
procurement practitioners select the right supplier selection method and apply them in such a 
way that the supplier selection method itself does not lead to problems and discussions. 
 
References 
 
Albano, G.L., Dini, F., Zampino, R., Suppliers’ Behavior in Competitive Tendering: Evidence 
from the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance’s Acquisitions of IT Services, 
Proceedings of the 3th IPPC Conference, Amsterdam (The Netherlands), August 28-30, 
2008.  
Boer L. de, Labro E., Morlacchi P., A review of methods supporting supplier selection, 
European Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, Volume 7, Number 2, pp. 75-
89 (15), 2001. 
De Boer, L., Linthorst, M.M., Schotanus, F., Telgen, J., An analysis of some mistakes, 
miracles and myths in supplier selection, Proceedings of the 15th IPSERA Conference, 
San Diego (United States), April 6-8, 2006.  
Boer L. de, van der Wegen L., Telgen J., Outranking methods in support of supplier selection, 
European Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, Volume 4, Number 2, pp. 109- 
118(10), 1998. 
Boer, L. de, van der Wegen, L., Practice and promise of formal supplier selection: a study of 
four empirical cases, Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management, Volume 9, Number 3, 
pp. 109-188, 2003. 
Choi T.Y., Hartley J.L., An exploration of supplier selection practices across the supply chain, 
Journal of Operations Management, Volume 14, Number 4, pp. 333-343(11), 1996. 
Dreschler, M., Fair competition, Ph.D. dissertation, Delft (the Netherlands): Delft University 
of Technology, 2009.  
Munson, C. L., Rosenblatt, M. J., The Impact Of Local Content Rules On Global Sourcing 
Decisions, Production And Operations Management, Volume 6, Number 3, pp. 277-
290(14), 1997. 
Narasimhan, R., An analytic approach to supplier selection, Journal of Purchasing and 
Materials Management, Volume 19, Number 1, pp. 27-32, 1983. 
Weber, C.A, Current, J.R., A multiobjective approach to vendor selection, European Journal 
of Operational Research, Volume 68, pp. 173-184, 1993. 
 
Appendix 
 
We define: 
   as the vector containing the price and delivery time of the winning bid; 
   as the vector containing the total score of the winning bid; 
   as the vector containing the prices and delivery times of the other bids; 
   as the vector containing the total scores of the other bids. 
 
Assumption 1.    and 1e  for each  .  
 
Proof of Theorem 1. If we assume there are two criteria (i.e., price and quality) that are 
scored with an absolute linear scoring method, then the total score for each supplier i is 
. As our question is to find out whether and when each 
supplier in a public tender can win, we need to compare the total scores of all suppliers to 
each other. If there are two suppliers and we want the first supplier to win, then 
. We can rewrite this as 
iii qgwpgwWFS  2211
21 WFSWFS  222211122111 qgwpgwqgwpgw  ,  
as 2q2g211211 pgqgpg  , as    212121 qqgppg  , and as 
12
21
21 pp
qqgg 
 . A similar line of reasoning can be applied to tenders with three or more 
criteria and/or three or more suppliers, because in all cases, the weights cancel each other out. 
Thus, the weights of the criteria do not play a role. □ 
 
Proof of Theorem 2. We prove Theorem 2 using a proof by contradiction. As absolute linear 
scoring methods are a subset of absolute curved scoring methods, we prove by contradiction 
that Theorem 2 is correct for absolute linear scoring methods. By doing so, we also prove by 
contradiction that the theorem is correct for absolute curved scoring methods. We start our 
proof as follows. As weights are irrelevant, we assume them being 0 and leave them out of 
our equations. Given our definitions for   and   we have  g  and g . Now,   
does not win if there is an   for which   . We can rewrite this as     gg  
and as   . This is in contradiction with Assumption 1 that states that    and 
1e  for each  . □  
 
Proof of Theorem 3. Similar to an absolute linear scoring method, a relative linear scoring 
method is of the form . Following a similar line of reasoning as in the proof of 
Theorem 1, the variable a does not play a role. After all, using s as the slope of the method, 
we can write 
ipba 
        221
2
222
21
1
111
21
2
22 sw 
 
1
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1
11 ,min,min,min,min
q
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sswp
pp
sswq
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ssw   
and rewrite this as       221
2
2
21
1
1
21
2
1
21
1
,min pp
s
,min,min,min
q
qq
sp
pp
sq
qq
sp  . 
We can rewrite this as        2121
2
12
21
1
,min,min
qq
qq
spp
pp
s  , as 
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2
1
2
21
1
,min,min qq
s
pp
s 
2
1
2 pp
qq

 , and as 
12
21
21 pp
qqgg 
 . Now, we can use the same 
proof as we used for Theorem 2 to prove Theorem 3. □ 
